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CASENOTES
CIVIL RIGHTS - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
TITLE VII - PRIVATE EMPLOYERS MAY VOLUNTARILY
ADOPT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION MEASURES TO ELIMINATE
CONSPICUOUS RACIAL IMBALANCE IN TRADITIONALLY
SEGREGATED JOB CATEGORIES. UNITED STEELWORKERS
OF AMERICA v. WEBER, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the passage of federaP and state2 legislation designed to
afford all persons equal employment opportunities, the courts have
been called upon frequently to review the hiring and promotional
practices of private employers. 3 Court decisions requiring that
minorities be given preference in order to ameliorate the impact of
prior discrimination have elicited the contention that such affirmative action programs constitute "reverse" discrimination 4 prohibited
by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 The Act is a two-edged
sword, inasmuch as its prohibition of discrimination is used not only
to justify the imposition of preferential programs, but also to
challenge them. It is generally recognized that Title VII does not
prohibit courts from imposing racial quotas6 preferring persons who
have been discriminated against on the basis of race.? In United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber,S the Supreme Court was faced with
the issue of whether an affirmative action program voluntarily
adopted by an employer violates Title VII. The litigation arose as a
result of an agreement between Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corporation (Kaiser) and the United Steelworkers of America
(USWA) to impose a racial quota system in order to increase the
percentage of black craft employees at Kaiser's Gramercy, Louisiana
plant. There had been no judicial determination that blacks seeking

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
2. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 14-16 (1979).
3. See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973) (court
ordered next thirty promotions to foreman on one-to-one basis); United States v.
Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (court ordered
one-for-one hiring ratio until percentage of blacks in certain positions equaled
20%).
4. See generally Janssen, The Use of Racial Preferences in Employment: The
Affirmative Action/Reverse Discrimination Dilemma, 32 VAND. L. REV. 783
(1979); Comment, How Far Can Affirmative Action Go Before It Becomes
Reverse Discrimination?, 26 CATH. L. REV. 513 (1977>.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
6. See 2 N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, B. NEUBORNE & S. LAW, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 961-65 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL RIGHTS).
7. Title VII also prohibits discrimination on the basis of color. religion. sex. and
national origin, but Weber only concerns racial discrimination.
8. 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
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employment at that plant had been discriminated against by either
Kaiser or the USWA. The Weber Court nevertheless held that Title
VII did not prohibit the employer and the union from voluntarily
adopting an affirmative action plan involving the use of racial quotas
to counter the effect of "societal" discrimination. 9
This casenote discusses the legality under Title VII of racially
based quotas voluntarily implemented by employers and reaches the
conclusion that the Court misconstrued Title VII when it validated
the quota plan in Weber and that it ignored evidence of actual
discrimination by Kaiser that should have significantly affected its
analysis. Finally, it suggests that Executive Order 11246,10 which
supplements legislative efforts in the area of civil rights, specifically
authorizes the adoption of the quota plan implemented by Kaiser and
the USWA.
II.

THE WEBER SETTING

In February, 1974, the Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation entered into a collective bargaining agreement l l with the United

9. Societal discrimination is distinguished from actual discrimination (discrimination) in that the former term does not describe a situation in which individual
employment practices have caused the underrepresentation of blacks in the
employer's workforce; rather, the underrepresentation was caused by factors
outside the control of the employer. Actual discrimination results directly from
an employer's .hiring pra.«tices.
The Supreme Court in University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), in applying the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
a special minority admissions program at a state medical school stated:
[T]he purpose of helping certain groups . . . perceived as victims of
'societal discrimination' does not justify a classification that imposes
disadvantages upon persons . . . who bear no responsibility for
whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are
thought to have suffered. To hold otherwise would be to convert a
remedy heretofore reserved for violations of legal rights into a privilege
that all institutions throughout the Nation could grant at their pleasure
to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal discrimination.
That is a step we have never approved.
Id. at 310. Bakke is only of academic value to Weber, however, because different
law was applied in each. Bakke involved the fourteenth amendment and Title
VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, while Weber was based solely upon Title VII.
10. 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note (1976l.
11. Weber deals solely with the legality of the agreement implemented in Kaiser's
Gramercy, Louisiana plant, although the agreement was designed to cover
fifteen Kaiser plants throughout the United States. In addition, although this
collective bargaining agreement specified hours of work, hourly wages, and
conditions of employment, the relevant provisions are those dealing with
minority representation in trade, craft, and assigned maintenance classifications. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 763 (E.D.
La. 1976). The agreement applied to blacks, other minority groups, and women,
but Weber deals solely with the agreement's application to preferences for
blacks. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 228 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
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Steelworkers of America, the union representing Kaiser employees.
The contract was intended to raise the percentage of blacks in craft
positions at Kaiser's Gramercy, Louisiana plant to thirty-nine
percent,12 the percentage of blacks in the local workforce. It provided
in pertinent part:
As apprentice and craft jobs are to be filled, the contractual
selection criteria shall be applied in reaching such goals; at a
minimum, not less than one minority employee will enter for
every non-minority entering until the goal is reached unless
at a particular time there are insufficient available qualified
minority candidates. 13
Prior to the 1974 agreement, Kaiser had selected employees for
its craft positions from persons already so skilled. 14 During this time,
the plant had conducted two on-the-job training programs, each of
which required prior craft experience as a prerequisite for admission. 15 The primary method of obtaining the craft experience
requisite for admission to Kaiser's program was to enroll in training
programs administered by the local trade unions. 16 These local
unions had traditionally discriminated against minorities with
regard to admissions. 17 Therefore, only a small number of blacks had
been able to gain the training necessary for craft employment at

12. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 764 (E.D. La.
1976).
13. Apper.dix at 137, Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979) (1974 Labor Agreement between
Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp. and United Steelworkers of America, Article
4, No.4).
14. Appendix at 125, Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
15. The carpenter-painter craft training program, begun in 1964, required one year
of prior experience. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission at 6, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S ..
Ct. 2721 (1979). In 1968, the second program, for the general-repairman craft,
began. [d. Initially, this training program required three years of experience,
but in 1971, the requirement was reduced to two years. Appendix at 126,
Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979). A total of eleven employees had entered the
on-the-job programs for the carpenter-painter craft during its existence (as of
the date of testimony at the district court). Brief for the United States and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 6, United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979). Only two of those eleven were black.
[d. Of the seventeen trainees selected for the general repairman training
program, all were white. [d.
16. Appendix at 63, Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979) (testimony of Dennis English,
industrial relations superintendent at Kaiser's Gramercy plant).
17. [d.
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Kaiser. ls The 1974 agreement provided for new on-the-job craft
training programs, admission to which did not require prior craft
experience.
Neither party to the 1974 agreement was motivated by altruism.
At the time the contract was executed, blacks comprised less than
two percent of the total craft population at the Gramercy plant. 19
Kaiser, a government contractor, realized that such a disproportionately small representatior. of blacks could result in the imposition of
sanctions by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC),20 the
agency charged with enforcing Executive Order 11246 mandating
equal employment opportunity. In addition, both Kaiser and the
union feared that private Title VII actions would be brought by
blacks alleging discrimination in the procedures for hiring and
training craft employees at Gramercy.21 Seeking to avoid costly
litigation, the parties entered into the 1974 agreement attacked in
Weber.22
Weber, a white employee at Kaiser's Gramercy plant, brought a
class action on behalf of all non-minority employees prevented from
entering on-the-job training programs solely because of race. 23 He
claimed that he had been rejected for admission to the craft training
programs established by the 1974 agreement, while blacks with less
seniority than he had been accepted. 24 Weber alleged that this
constituted discrimination violative of Title VIps

18. In February, 1974, the total Kaiser workforce was 14.8~ black. Weber v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chern. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 764 (E.D. La. 1976>. Prior to 1974,
blacks made up only 1.83% (5 of 273) of the craft workers at the Gramercy
plant. Brief for Petitioner, Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp. at 3, United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979), A dual seniority list
was designed in accordance with the 1974 Labor Agreement. One black and one
white were selected for each two openings for trainees. Each trainee would be
selected according to seniority within his respective racial group. Weber v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 1977).
19. See note 18 supra.
20. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 228-29 (5th Cir.
1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
21. [d. at 229.
22. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 765 (E.D. La.
1976).
23. [d. at 763.
24. Brian Weber would not have been selected for any of the training programs at
the time of the trial even if the sole prerequisite to entrance were plant
seniority. Appendix at 88, Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 119791. Standing to sue.
however, would still exist. As long as the program would affect him in the
future, Brian Weber need not currently suffer the effects of discrimination.
Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1188 17th Cir. 1971). cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 939 <19711. Because the action was brougnt on behalf of a
class, another class member could have replaced Weber had his standing been
found defective. Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co .. 471 F.2d 13. 15-16 14th Cir.
19721.
25. 415 F. Supp. at 763.
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III. THE SUIT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
A.

The District Court Opinion

The federal district court26 agreed with Weber's contentions and
permanently enjoined Kaiser from denying non-minority employees
admission to on-the-job training programs because of race. 27 The
court ruled that Kaiser's quota plan violated both section 703(a) of
Title vn/s which expressly prohibits an employer from discriminating on the basis of race, and section 703(d),z9 which includes
admissions to training programs within the reach of the Act's
prohibition of racial discrimination.
While recognizing the broad power of the judiciary to remedy the
effect of past discriminatory practices of an employer, even to the
extent of establishing quota systems that discriminate against

26. 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976).
27. Id. at 770.
28. Section 703(a), 42 U.s.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Section 703(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1976) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to
discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for
membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any
individual, in any way' which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an individual in violation of this section.
29. Section 703(d), 42 U.s.C. ~ 2000e-2(d) (1976) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training
programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in,
any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
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individual employees,30 the trial court held that similar voluntary
action by an employer is impermissible. 3l It stated that in the
absence of a showing that the individual blacks preferred over more
senior whites had been the victims of unlawful discrimination by
Kaiser, affirmative action programs like Kaiser's violate Title VII.32
Because the evidence at trial did not demonstrate that Kaiser had
discriminated against these blacks with regard to hiring, the district
court held that even the judiciary did not have the authority to order
the quota implemented by Kaiser and the union. 33
In defending the agreement, Kaiser relied upon section 703(j),34
contending that while that section did not require imposition of
quotas to counter racial imbalance, it also did not prohibit them. 3s In

30. 415 F. Supp. at 766-67. Proff of the power of courts to provide a remedy when
they discover discrimination is found in the statute itself. Section 706(g) of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.s.C. § 2000e-5(g), provides
in relevant part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in
the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action
as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable
by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case
may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
31. "The proscriptions of the statute are directed solely to employers." 415 F. Supp.
at 767.
32. [d. at 768-69. The Supreme Court, in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 418 (1975), recognized the "make whole'~ purpose of Title VII. This remedy
is best described by the fact that U[t]he injured party is to be placed, as near as
may be, in the situation he would have occupied if the wrong had not been
committed." Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99 (1867) (quoted by the
majority in Moody, 422 U.s. at 418-19). In Moody, the employer was found to
have discriminated against those black employees receiving relief under Title
VII.
33. 415 F. Supp. at 769.
34. 415 F. Supp. at 766. Section 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976), provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer, employment agency, labor organization or joint labormanagement committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential
treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of
an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any
employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or
classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any
apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the total
number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the
available workforce in any community, State, section, or other area.
35. 415 F. Supp. at 766.
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response, the trial court stated that section 703(j) could not
"override" the clear meaning of Title VII, which prohibited the quota
adopted by Kaiser and the USWA. 36 The court maintained that had
Congress wanted to allow such voluntary action to correct racial
imbalance, it would have so provided in the Act. 37
In addition, the court implicitly acknowledged Kaiser's argument that the Executive Order program authorized the quota
system. 3S Although it found the objectives of that program exemplary, it was unwilling to approve an affirmative action plan that it
found clearly violated Title VII.39 The court believed that if
exceptions were to be made to the prohibitions of Title VII, it was
solely the job of Congress to make them. 40

B.

The Court of Appeals Opinion

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit4l affirmed the
judgment of the district court,42 but disagreed with the lower court's
conclusion that employers and unions may never voluntarily implement quota systems,43 observing that voluntary action to eliminate
employment discrimination was the "central theme" of Title VII. 44
The court of appeals failed, however, to specify the extent to which
voluntary remedial action may be permitted. It merely affirmed the
district court's holding that in the absence of prior discrimination by

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

[d.
[d. at 769-70.
[d. at 769.
[d.
[d. at 770.
563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977).
[d. at 227.
[d. at 223. The court did state that strong authority existed for the proposition
that courts have broader remedial powers than private employers. [d. Sections
703(a), (d), (h) & (j) of the 1964 Act were restrictions on employers and not on
the courts. [d. at 224.
44. [d. at 223. Accord, Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir.
1968) (There is great emphasis in Title VII on private settlement and the
elimination of discriminatory employment practices without litigation.). As an
indication of the interest in private settlement of Title VII violation claims, 42
U.s.C. 2000e-5(b) provides in part: "If the Commission [EEOC] determines
after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the
charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate such alleged
unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation,
and persuasion."
No Title VII charges had been filed against Kaiser because of its
employment practices at the Gramercy plant as of the time the 1974 Agreement
was initiated. At that time, Kaiser was only aware of charges of Title VII
violations at its Baton Rouge plant and about ongoing Title VII litigation at its
Chalmette facility. Brief for Petitioner (Kaiser) at 4, United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979). The Kaiser and United Steelworkers
Agreement was formed in the absence of an EEOC investigation into possible
Title VII violations.

*
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Kaiser against those blacks receiving preferential treatment, the
voluntary quota plan violated Title VII.45
As had the district court, the Fifth Circuit noted that even the
judiciary could not impose a racial quota that does not guarantee
preferential treatment to the actual victims of discrimination. 46
Although recognizing that blacks had suffered from societal discrimination, the court emphasized that Kaiser itself had not been shown
to have discriminated against blacks. It rejected the argument that
victims of societal discrimination should be preferred, stating that a
preference was' valid only to restore employees to their "rightful
places" within a particular employment scheme47 - those positions
each would have obtained in the absence of discrimination by the

45. 563 F.2d at 224.
46.
Title VII outlaws preferences for any group, minority or majority, if
based on race or other impermissible classifications, but it does not
outlaw preferences favoring victims of discrimination. A minority
worker who has been kept from his rightful place by discriminatory
hiring practices may be entitled to preferential treatment "not because
he is Black, but because, and only to the extent that, he has been
discriminated against." 563 F.2d at 224-25 (quoting Chance v. Bo-ard of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993, 999
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977)).
Mr. English, Kaiser's industrial relations supervisor at the Gramercy
plant, testified as to the non-discriminatory nature of Kaiser's employment
practices: "In an attempt to correct an imbalance in the number of minorities in
the Gramercy plant compared with the number of minorities in the labor force,
Kaiser began, in 1969, to hire, on a 50 percent minority basis, employees for
jobs requiring no prior experience." Appendix at 78, Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721
(1979). In addition, according to Mr. English, Kaiser never had a discriminatory plant seniority system, [d. at 72, and the statistical imbalance in
employment was caused by factors unrelated to Kaiser's past hiring practices.
[d. at 77.
Although Kaiser and the USWA argued that prior discrimination by
Kaiser was shown because prior craft experience was formerly required for
admittance to on-the-job training programs, the court of appeals found the
program too limited in its effect on hiring to be valuable evidence in proving
discrimination. 563 F.2d at 224 n.13. Only 28 employees in all had become craft
employees due to the craft training programs which had required prior
experience. [d.
47. A minority employee is entitled to his rightful place in the employment scheme,
not because he is a minority, but because he is a victim of past unlawful
discrimination. 563 F.2d at 224-25 (citing in part, Chance v. Board of
Examiners, 534 F.2d 993, 999 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977»).
The fact that some unnamed and unknown White person in the
distant-past may, by reason of past racial discrimination in which the
present applicant in no way participated, have received preferences over
some unidentified minority person with higher qualifications is no
justification for discriminating against the present better qualified upon
the basis of race.
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 325 (8th Cir. 1971l (en banc), cert. denied,
406 U.s. 950 (1972>.
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employer.48 It found that the plant-wide seniority system Kaiser used
before the 1974 agreement was non-discriminatory.49 Because the
quota instituted by the 1974 agreement went beyond restoring
persons to their "rightful places," it violated Title VII. 50
Kaiser and the USWA also contended that Executive Order
11246 and the regulations implementing it provided authority for
imposition of the quota, notwithstanding Title VII's prohibition of
discrimination. 51 Weber responded that Kaiser had already fulfilled
the affirmative action requirements of the Executive Order and that
the quota therefore was excessive. 52 The Fifth Circuit did not
consider the effect of the Executive Order on the suit in light of its

48. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976). In Franks, the Court
stated that once members of a plaintiff class have been shown by the employer
not to have been the particular victims of racial discrimination, then seniority
relief, given to the other members of the class of actual victims, will be denied
to those non-victims. [d. at 772-73.
49. 563 F.2d at 226. The framers of Title VII insisted on preserving existing
seniority systems after the enactment of the Act. Senators Joseph Clark and
Clifford Case, the Act's floor managers, submitted interpretive memoranda
prepared by the Department of Justice and themselves, indicating that (1) no
existing seniority rights would be affected; (2) the act operated only prospectively and mandated no alteration of existing seniority rights; and (3)
differences in the treatment of employees based on seniority would not be Title
VII violations, particularly "last hired, first fired" provisions of many labor
contracts. 110 CONGo REC. 7207, 7212-13, 7217 (1964). Judge Wisdom, in his
dissent in the court of appeals, criticized the majority's acceptance of the
district court's finding of no past discrimination at Gramercy because he
believed the majority used the wrong standard in judging Kaiser's actions.
Weber V. Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 229 (5th Cir. 1977).
He maintained that allowing voluntary compliance only when a court would
have permitted such action would bring about less voluntary compliance
overall and would place the employer and union in a difficult position. [d. at
230. Judge Wisdom noted that the employer and the union were faced with
liability from two directions because on the one hand they faced the possibility
of litigation from minorities under Title VII and sanctions under Executive
Order 11246, and, on the other, the threat of suit by whites if Kaiser's remedies
were excessive. [d. He claimed that in order for voluntary compliance to exist at
all, Kaiser and the union should be able to invoke the quota in question if it
was a "reasonable remedy for an arguable violation of Title VII." [d. Judge
Wisdom found evidence indicating possible violations of Title VII, although at
trial the court simply accepted the testimony of two Kaiser personnel officers
that no discrimination existed. [d. at 231. He observed that in a suit such as
this, a peculiar event occurs in the presentation of evidence. No litigant wants
to have discrimination discovered. [d. Kaiser and the union could only admit
past discrimination at the great risk of inviting private Title VII suits by
blacks. [d. Additionally, Weber risked losing his ability to prove reverse
discrimination if actual discrimination was shown, because a quota would have
been considered a proper response to actual discrimination by Kaiser. [d.
50. 563 F.2d at 226.
51. [d. See notes 105-118 and accompanying text infra.
52. 563 F.2d at 226. Weber argued that the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
improperly coerced Kaiser into implementing the quota, because the requirements of Executive Order 11246 had been met prior to the OFCC's threats to
withdraw federal contracts. [d.
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finding of a Title VII violation, stating that "executive orders may
not override contradictory congressional expressions."53

C. The Supreme Court Opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan's majority opinion reversed the judgments
of the district court and the court of appeals. 54 Emphasizing the need
to examine the legislative history of Title VII, the majority rejected
Weber's reliance on the "literal interpretation of sections 703(a) and
(d) of the Act,"55 finding that such a literal interpretation contradicted the legislative intent underlying Title VII.56
Justice Brennan reasoned that Title VII was designed to give
blacks employment opportunities not previously available to them
and that in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress had
intended that employers and unions examine their own employment
policies and voluntarily adopt programs to eliminate discriminationY The language of section 703G), Justice Brennan noted, was
further evidence of Congress' intent to allow voluntary' "race
conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation
and hierarchy."58 Section 703(j) states that, "[n]othing . . . shall be
interpreted to require any employer [or] labor organization . . . to
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group. . .
on account of a racial imbalance in the employer's workforce."59 Had
Congress intended to disallow voluntary action by employers and
labor unions it could easily have done so, said Justice Brennan, by
stating not only that Title VII did not require but also that it did not
permit preferential treatment merely designed to eliminate racial

53. [d. at 227. When an executive order and a statute conflict, the statute prevails
as long as Congress acted pursuant to its constitutional powers. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The majority recognized that
Executive Order 11246 had been previously upheld as valid in Contractors
Assoc. of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 854 (1971). The court, however, found that the affirmative action imposed
in that case was a result of the finding of "prior exclusionary practices by the
six trade unions controlling the work force." 563 F.2d at 227.
54. 99 S. Ct. at 2726. Justice Brennan stated the issue: "[Wlhether Title VII forbids
private employers and unions from voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide
affirmative action plans that accord racial preferences in the manner and for
the purpose provided in the Kaiser-USWA plan." 99 S. Ct. at 2726 (emphasis in
original). Two other possible issues were summarily disposed of by Justice
Brennan. First, there was no alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution, because no state action was involved. Second, what a court
may order as a "remedy to a past proven violation of the Act" is not important
to the case at bar, because the Kaiser-USWA plan was adopted voluntarily. [d.
55. 99 S. Ct. at 2726.
56. [d. at 2727.
57. [d. at 2727-28.
58. [d. at 2728-29.
59. See note 34 supra.
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imbalance. 60 Justice Brennan emphasized that in enacting the Civil
Rights Act, both Houses of Congress had desired to keep employers
and unions free from undue governmental interference. 61 He found
that Congress had intended to enable private businesses to take
voluntary steps towards reaching the statutory goal of equal
opportunity.62
Justice Brennan did not set forth a test for determining under
what circumstances voluntary action would be permissible under
Title VII, stating only that the Kaiser-USWA plan was "on the
permissible side of the line."63 He did, however, provide some general
reasons to support this conclusion. First, the agreement was designed
to create opportunities for blacks in jobs historically unavailable to
them. 64 Second, no white employees were discharged from jobs and
replaced by black employees,65 and there was no absolute bar to the
advancement of whites. 66 Finally, the plan was a temporary action,
not intended to maintain racial balance, but to eliminate "manifest
racial imbalance."67

60. 99 S. Ct. at 2729.
61. [d.
62. [d.
63. [d. at 2730.

64. [d.
65. [d.
66. [d. One-half of those entering the training program were white.
67. [d. "Preferential selection of craft trainees at the Gramercy plant will end as
soon as the percentage of black skilled craft workers in the Gramercy plant
approximates the percentage of blacks in the local labor force." [d. Justice
Blackmun, in his' concurring opinion, agreed with Judge Wisdom's dissent in
the court of appeals, stating that the "arguable violation" theory was
advantageous to solving the problem of when voluntary action may be taken by
a private employer. For the definition of "arguable violation," see text
accompanying note 98 infra. Blackmun claimed that the "arguable violation"
theory had many advantages in that it effectuated the Act's purpose and helped
solve problems not anticipated by Congress when developing Title VII
legislation. [d. at 2732: Initially, Justice Blackmun maintained that the
majority view was too permissive in practice, because it allowed voluntary
affirmative action whenever the job category typically was segregated as a
result of pervasive segregation. [d. After a "closer look," the majority view was
acceptable to him. [d.
According to Justice Brennan, the employer need not have a history of
employment discrimination to implement the Kaiser-USWA plan. If the
arguable violation theory were imposed as a standard, Justice Blackmun noted,
the threshold level of discrimination, at which point voluntary action would be
permitted, would have to be set at a low level to permit an employer to take
affirmative action without subjecting himself to costly litigation and possible
monetary damages. [d. at 2733. The reason for taking voluntary action is to
avoid litigation. As a result, Blackmun maintained, a mere disparity between
the percentage of minority employees and the percentage of minorities in the
local workforce would qualify as an arguable violation. [d. In Kaiser's situation,
an arguable violation was shown by the statistical disparity between the
percentage of blacks in craft positions at the Gramercy plant and their
percentage representation in the local workforce.
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Nowhere did the Court dispute the lower courts' finding that
there had been no actual discrimination by Kaiser and the USWA.
Rather, it attributed the disproportionately small representation of
blacks in the craft trades at Gramercy to societal discrimination.
Prior to Weber, no affirmative action program employing a quota
system, whether court-imposed or voluntary, had passed judicial
scrutiny absent a showing that it had been implemented to redress
the effect of actual discrimination. 68
In dissent, Chief Justice Burger argued that the position taken
by the Court's majority in Weber was legislatively desirable but
judicially unsound. 69 He stated that Title VII was written with
"extraordinary clarity,"70 and that it was "enacted to make discrimination against any individual illegal."71 The Chief Justice further
noted that the clear language of section 703(d) prohibited the quota
contained in the Kaiser-USWA plan72 and that by according a
preference to some individuals, the plan discriminated against
others.73
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist examined
the wording of the statutes and observed that in permitting race to
be the basis of the Kaiser-USWA agreement the majority had
rejected the literal meaning of sections 703(a), (d), and (j),74 as well as
the Court's own precedent. 75 Congress could not have drafted
language that more strongly prohibited the race-based labor agreement in Weber, he stated, indicating that sections 703(d) and
703(a)(2) were directly on point. 76 Both sections describe as unlawful
the classification and unequal treatment of employees on the basis of

68. The issue of whether voluntary affirmative action is subject to a different Title
VII standard than court-ordered remedies for a Title VII violation was
"expressly left open," 99 S. Ct. at 2726, in McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 427 U.S. 273, 281 n.8 <1976l.
69. 99 S. Ct. at 2734.
70. [d.
71. [d. at 2735.
72. [d. at 2734.

73. [d.
74. [d. at 2736, 2737, 2739.
75. [d. at 2737. The precedent referred to was from prior Supreme Court decisions:

Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978) ("ITlhe obligation
imposed by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for each applicant
regardless of race, without regard to whether members of the applicant's race
are already proportionately represented in the work force." (emphasis in
originalll; McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co .. 427 U.S. 273. 283 (1976'
(Title VII "prohibits all racial discrimination in employment. without exception
for any particular employees . . . . " (emphasis in original)); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("Discriminatory preference for any group.
minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed."'.
76. 99 S. Ct. at 2739.

1980J

United Steelworkers v. Weber

283

race. He observed that section 703(j) and the other two sections are
theoretically consistent. 77
Next, Justice Rehnquist noted that despite the clarity of Title
VII's language, the majority had deemed it necessary to resort to
legislative history in construing the Act, and in doing so had
incorrectly interpreted congressional intent. 78 In conclusion, he
observed that the majority opinion was poor precedent for future
Title VII suits because it legitimized the use of voluntary racial
quotas to offset racial imbalances in the workforce, "the very evil

77. Justice Rehnquist demonstrated that the sections had different purposes. 99 S.
Ct. at 2749. Sections 703(a) and (d) were directed at employers and labor
unions, while section 703(j) was directed at courts and federal agencies.
The majority maintained that voluntary action to correct an imbalance was
proper, because Title VII intended for management decisions in hiring to be
disturbed as little as possible. Because the purpose of Title VII was to prevent
discrimination on the basis of race, freedom in management decisions can be
consistent with the goal of Title VII by allowing management to make its own
employment choices as long as those choices are made without regard to race.
[d. at 2749 n.25. Furthermore, Rehnquist questioned the majority claim that
Kaiser should have a right voluntarily to adopt the quota to correct racial
imbalance, when basically its reason for adopting the quota was to avoid
sanctions from the Office of Federal Contract Compliance. [d. at 2749.
78. [d. at 2740-41. Opponents of the bill, which eventually became the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, in the House of Representatives frequently argued during debates
and in written reports that employers would be forced to hire on the basis of
race to alleviate a racial imbalance in employment, For example, one minority
report charged that discrimination would be defined by the administration as
"lack of racial balance." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong.~ 2d Sess. 67-68 (1963),
reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2431, 2436. In response to
these assertions, proponents of the bill argued that this was exactly what the
bill proscribed. When the bill reached the House floor, Representative Celler,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and the Congressman who
introduced the legislation, stated that "[t]he Bill would do no more than
prevent . . . employers from discriminating against or in favor of workers
because of their race [sic]." Neither a court nor the EEOC "would have power to
rectify existing 'racial or religious imbalance' in employment by requiring the
hiring of certain people without regard to their qualification [sic] simply
because they are a given race or religion. Only actual discrimination could be
stopped." 110 CONGo REc. 1518 (1964),
.
In the Senate, similar attacks were made on the interpretation of the Civil
Rights bill. Senator Humphrey, a strong proponent of the bill in the Senate,
described the meaning of discrimination as "a distinction and treatment given
to different individuals because of their different race [siel." In concurrence
with Senator Humphrey's interpretation of the bill, Senators Clark and Case
clarified the bill's meaning as to preferential treatment:
There is no requirement in title VII that an employer maintain a racial
balance in his work force. On the contrary, any deliberate attempt to
maintain a racial balance, whatever such a balance may be, would
involve a violation of title VII because maintaining such a balance
would require an employer to hire or to refuse to hire on the basis of
race. It must be emphasized that discrimination is prohibited as to any
individual.
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that the law was intended to eradicate," and articulated no limits for
permissible voluntary affirmative action plans. 79
IV.

ANALYSIS

Weber holds that Title VII does not prohibit employers from
voluntarily implementing racially based affirmative action programs
in order to redress the effects of societal discrimination,80 provided
the plan lies on the "permissible side of the line." The decision
accords private employers a prerogative denied the courts, because
the Court has held that Title VII prohibits the judiciary from
imposing racial quotas absent a showing of actual discrimination by
the employer.8l Neither the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its
legislative history, nor the Court's prior decisions are in accord with
the Weber majority's approach to Title VII controversies.
The Court buttressed its holding with strained interpretations of
Title VII. The majority construed the section 703(j) prohibition of
preferential affirmative action programs to apply solely to courts and
not to private employers.82 This construction was premised on the
fact that although section 703(j) does not require employers to
formulate affirmative action programs, it likewise does not prohibit
them from doing so. It can be more readily asserted, however, that
had Congress intended to empower employers to institute such
preferential programs, it would have expressly stated as much in
section 703(j) - particularly so as to overcome the prohibition in

79.
80.

81.
82.

110 CONGo REC. 7213. Justice Rehnquist felt that the following observations,
made by the Senators, were spoken as if they were directed at Brian Weber
himself:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect
is prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has
been discriminating when the title comes into effect the employer's
obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be obliged - or indeed permitted - to fire
whites in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies,
or, once Negroes are hired, to give them special seniority rights as the
white workers hired earlier.
110 CONGo REC. 7213 (1964) (emphasis added).
99 S. Ct. at 2753. The Court, however, did provide some limits. See notes 64-67
and accompanying text supra.
This indication is derived from the Court's holding that Title VII permits the
"private sector voluntarily to adopt affirmative action plans designed to
eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories." 99 S. Ct. at 2730. Only a few, if any, job categories have not evidenced
conspicuous racial discrimination.
See note 75 supra.
As Justice Rehnquist pointed out, no opponent or proponent of Title VII in the
Senate even implied, much less directly stated, that the statute would allow
private employers voluntarily to prefer black employees over white employees.
99 S. Ct. at 2748.
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sections 703(a) and (d) of discriminatory hiring practices. The
conspicuous absence in section 703(j) of language expressly empowering employers to formulate preferential employment schemes is,
therefore, a strong indication that the majority misconstrued the
statute. Tenets of statutory construction compel the same conclusion.
Express prohibitions in a statute prevail over negative inferences,sa
and the various parts of a legislative enactment should be read
consistently with each other.84
The Court found additional justification for its interpretation of
Title VII in the fact that Congress had emphasized the importance of
"traditional management prerogatives" in attaining the Title VII
ideal of voluntary compliance. The majority asserted that by
permitting voluntary action, management would have the freedom to
achieve this employment goal without undue governmental interference. 85 In reality, however, Kaiser exercised no real freedom of choice
in adopting the program disputed in Weber. Rather, the corporation
was acting in response to possible Title VII suits and sanctions from
the Office of Federal Contract Compliance, the enforcement arm of
Executive Order 11246, arising from its earlier hiring practices.
Consequently, Kaiser implemented the plan not to integrate its
workforce voluntarily, but rather to avoid both costly litigation and
the loss of federal contracts. 86 Indeed, had Kaiser's quota system once
implemented been improper with respect to necessity or scope, a
court would have had the power to order changes had anyone sued on
the ground of reverse discrimination. These considerations indicate
anything but freedom of choice. The sole voluntary aspect of Kaiser's
implementation of affirmative action was the absence of a court
order.
Additionally, the Court misinterpreted section 703(j) when it
partially based its validation of the Kaiser-USWA agreement on the

83. See C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05 (4th ed. 1973).
84. [d. Senator Humphrey's interpretation of § 703(j) was in accordance with this

view:
A new subsection 703(j) is added to deal with the problem of racial
balance among employees. The proponents of the bill have carefully
stated on numerous occasions that title VII does not require an
employer to achieve any sort of racial balance in his workforce by giving
preferential treatment to any individual or gToup. Since doubts have
persisted, subsection (j) is added to state this point expressly. This
subsection does not represent any change in the substance of the title. It
does state clearly and accurately what we have maintained all along
about the bill's intent and meaning.
110 CONGo REC. 12723 (1964) (emphasis added).
85. As Justice Rehnquist declared, U[t]he whole purpose of Title VII was to deprive
employers of their 'traditional business freedom' to discriminate on the basis of
race." 99 S. Ct. at 2749 n.25.
86. One sanction against government contractors is the loss of federal contracts. 3
C.F.R. 169 (1974), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note (1976).
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fact that the plan was a temporary measure,87 "not intended to
maintain [a] racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial
imbalance."88 As Justice Rehnquist pointed out, however, the distinction between eliminating a "manifest racial imbalance" and maintaining a racial balance has no foundation in Title VII.89 If, as the
majority emphasized, the main purpose of Title VII is to open
employment opportunities for blacks, the distinction between
whether an employer could take voluntary affirmative action
measures to eliminate racial imbalances or to maintain racial
balances is one without a difference. 9o
The Court decided Weber without relying on its own precedent
interpreting Title VII. Prior Supreme Court decisions mandated the
elimination of race as a factor in employment only pursuant to a
showing of past actual discrimination. 91 The Court maintained that
voluntary action by a private employer should be judged against a
different standard than the court ordered affirmative action with

87. An estimate of the time necessary for black representation to reach 30% in the
skilled crafts at Gramercy ranged from 15 to 20 years. Appendix at 87. Weber,
99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979) (testimony of Dennis English, industrial relations
superintendent of Kaiser's Gramercy plant).
88. 99 S. Ct. at 2730.
89. Id. at 2746 n.19.
90.Id.
91. "An employer will remain wholly free to hire on the basis of his needs and of
the job candidate's qualifications. What is prohibited is the refusal to hire
someone because of race or religion." 110 CONGo REC. 5094 (remarks by Senator
Humphrey).
"Title VII prohibits discrimination. In effect, it says that race, religion and
national origin are not to be used as the basis for hiring and firing." 110 CONGo
REC. at 6549 (Senator Humphrey). "[T]he bill now before us . . . is color-blind."
Id. at 6564 (Senator Kuchell. "The language of [the civil rights bill] simply
states that race is not a qualification for employment. Every man must be
judged according to his ability." Id. at 8921 (Senator Williams). "Basically, I
believe that the color of a man's skin, or the faith to which he adheres, should
be completely extraneous considerations when an employer hires or a labor
union admits to membership. . . ." Id. at 9881. "Everything in this proposed
legislation has to do with providing a body of law which will surround and
protect the individual from some power complex. This bill is designed for the
protection of individuals. When an individual is wronged he can invoke the
protection to himself . . . . " 110 CONGo REC. 1540 (statement of Representative
Lindsay) (emphasis added). "The suggestion that racial balance or quota
systems would be imposed by this proposed legislation is entirely inaccurate."
Id. at 7207 (Senator Clark's statement!. These quotes present strong evidence
that the Act was directed at individuals and not minority group members.
When rights are given to individuals themselves, those particular individuals
are protected as persons and not as members of a larger group. If societal
discrimination was the basis of relief, members of the group discriminated
against would have a right to relief without having been the actual victims of
discrimination.
As one incisive professional commentator writes:
[A quota] achieves those purposes in circumstances where more
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which all prior Title VII cases had been involved. 92 Voluntary action,
however, although the preferred means of achieving Title VII
objectives,93 is intended to achieve the same goals as is action
pursuant to court order, and therefore should be judged by the same
standard.
Despite the majority's misplaced reliance on what it considered
the voluntary aspect of the affirmative action program in Weber, the
Court was correct in recognizing that voluntary compliance is the
preferred means of achieving the objectives of Title VII.94 This is
evidenced by the language of Title VII and court decisions construing
it. 95 The difficulty arises, in Weber and in other cases, when one
attempts to formulate a workable standard governing when employers may appropriately use their own initiative to implement
affirmative action programs voluntarily. On one hand, if an employer that had not been involved in discriminatory behavior were
allowed to adopt affirmative action voluntarily, an explicit prohibition of Title VII would be violated, providing grounds for reverse
discrimination suits. 96 This result also contravenes the Title VII goal

moderate forms of relief will be ineffective. For example, the courts
order [quotas] to compensate for past discrimination when the victims of
the discrimination cannot be identified; or to assure future equal
opportunity when it is clear that simply ordering an employer to
eliminate unlawful hiring practices will not encourage minority group
members to seek positions with that employer; or when the evidence
establishes that an employer will not comply with a prior, more
moderate order.
Slate, Preferential Relief in Employment Discrimination Cases, Loy. CHI. L.J.
315,323 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Preferential Relief]. As Senator Humphrey
noted, "[A]ny deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever such a
balance may be, would involve a violation of title VII because maintaining such
a balance would require an employer to hire or refuse to hire on the basis of
race. It must be emphasized that discrimination is prohibited as to any
individual." 110 CONGo REC. 7213 (emphasis added).
92. Justice Brennan maintained that federal governmental interference with
private employment practices, not private voluntary action to eliminate societal
discrimination, was sought to be eliminated by section 703(j). 99 S. Ct. at 2729.
93. This was stated in the majority opinion at the court of appeals level, 563 F.2d at
216, and in the majority opinion of Justice Brennan. 99 S. Ct. at 2727-30. In
fact, the wording of Title VII itself evidences Congress' desire for voluntary
compliance. "If the Commission [EEOC] shall determine, after such investigation, that there is a reasonable cause to believe that the charge [brought by an
employee against his employer] is true, the Commission shall endeavor to
eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods
of conference, conciliation and persuasion." Title VII, 706(a).
In United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.
1975), the court emphasized that voluntary. compliance in eliminating unfair
employment practices is preferable to court action. See also Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 258 (5th Cir. 1974),
94. See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
95.Id.
96. See notes 28 & 29 supra.
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of avoidance of litigation. 97 On the other hand, if employers were
allowed to implement affirmative action programs voluntarily only
pursuant to a showing of actual discrimination, they would never
implement a voluntary remedy because to do so would be to admit
past actual discrimination upon which Title VII suits could be
predicated. The solution to this problem, then, must lie somewhere
between the two extremes just mentioned.
In light of this dilemma, Justice Blackmun proposed an
intermediate standard. This approach avoids the use of Justice
Brennan's sweeping "societal discrimination" standard to determine
when employers may voluntarily adopt affirmative action plans.
According to Justice Blackmun, private employers may voluntarily
adopt reasonable affirmative action programs in order to redress the
effect of "arguable violations" of Title VIps - that is, whenever there
is an arguable, yet demonstrable, connection between minority
underrepresentation in a particular company and that employer's
hiring practices. This is a less stringent standard than the "actual"
discrimination standard employed in earlier decisions, yet not so lax
as that actually used by the Weber court. The standard would not be
satisfied by a statistical disparity reflecting mere societal discrimination. The arguable violation rule would enable employers to avoid
liability for prior discrimination while conceding that their past
hiring practices may have had a discriminatory effect.
The facts in Weber demonstrate that Kaiser committed two
arguable violations of Title VII. First, Kaiser· hired skilled craft
employees directly from the local unions, which had traditionally
discriminated on the basis of race. Second, Kaiser admitted to its
skilled craft training programs only persons with prior craft
experience, which, in the Gramercy area, could be acquired only
through membership in the local unions. 99
97. One reason voluntary compliance with Title VII is welcomed is because
litigation can be avoided. Allowing an employer to comply with Title VII when
the employer has not discriminated, however, is a misnomer. In the absence of
discrimination by the employer, the employer is in compliance with Title VII.
Voluntary action taken under these circumstances will only place the employer
in noncompliance, affording opportunities for litigation.
In addition, voluntary compliance with Title VII is a substitute for a
district court remedy for a violation. Comment, Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp.: The Challenge to Voluntary Compliance Under Title VII, 14
COLUM. J. L. Soc. PROB. 123, 139 (1978). When an employer acts to vary from a
nondiscriminatory employment practice, the plan is not remedial and the
employer is not acting as a court would. Id.
98. 99 S. Ct. at 2731-32.
99. In order to rebut this prima facie case of discrimination, Kaiser would have
been required to show that this method of hiring and training craft persons was
permitted by business necessity. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971). A business necessity could only be shown by evidence that the hiring
and training procedures had "a manifest relationship to the employment in
question." Id. at 432. Convenience and the saving of expenses are not sufficient
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Additionally, Kaiser's near-total exclusion of blacks from craft
positions at its Gramercy plant justified the challenged quota. As a
general proposition, courts are more likely to order quotas rather
than other less extreme relief when an employer's past practices
have resulted in almost total exclusion of blacks from a portion of the
workforce. 100 At the same time, however, courts attempt to tailor the
relief granted so as to minimize harm to white employees. 101 As
Justice Brennan's opinion in Weber noted, the Kaiser plan did not
provide for the firing of white employees to make room for blacks. It
created trainee positions for both whites and blacks, and it was only
temporary. 102 Consequently, because a court finding a Title VII
violation by Kaiser could have ordered the quota system assailed by
Brian Weber/03 an employer that under the "arguable violation"
standard would possess more latitude than the courts to initiate
remedial activity could certainly engage in the make-whole quota
remedy giving rise to the controversy in Weber.

to constitute a business necessity. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791,
100.
101.
102.
103.

799 n.8 (4th Cir. 1971).
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 961.
Preferential Relief, supra note 91, at 344.
99 S. Ct. at 2730.
In a factual situation similar to Weber, but based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1983, a federal district court found unlawful discrimination and instituted the
same quota system voluritarily adopted by Kaiser. In Crockett v. Green, 388 F.
Supp. 912 (E.D. Wis. 1975), affd, 534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976), the defendants,
officers of the City of Milwaukee, were charged with discriminating against
blacks in the hiring of skilled craft workers. In hiring a certain class of skilled
craft workers, the defendants required prospective employees to have completed
a formal apprenticeship in the specific trade and to have worked a certain
number of years as journeymen following completion of the apprenticeship. The
fact was that the building trade unions provided the only source of journeymen
who had also completed a formal apprenticeship in most of the skilled craft
positions. As a result of the low percentage of blacks employed by the building
trades industry, only 3.1% of the total number of persons employed in skills
craft positions by the City of Milwaukee and the Board of School Directors were
black.
The court found a prima facie case of discrimination due to the disparity
between the percentage of black population in Milwaukee 07.2%) and the
percentage of blacks employed in skilled craft positions (3.1%). Following
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971>, the court announced that the
burden of proof shifted to the defendants to show that their job requirements
were permitted by a "business necessity." The defendants were unable to show
such "business necessity," and the court mandated that for every two job
openings in skilled craft positions, one qualified black would be appointed for
every white until the percentage of blacks in that job classification equaled the
percentage of blacks in the City of Milwaukee.
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V. WAS WEBER A FICTION?
The Court failed to limit its holding to the actual facts of the
case when it stated the issue as: "[W]hether Title VII forbids private
employers and unions from voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide
affirmative action plans that accord racial preferences in the manner
and for the purpose provided in the Kaiser-USWA plan."lo4 Reverse
discrimination suits are anomalous because neither party wants to
offer evidence of discrimination by the employer. The plaintiff will
harm his chances of proving reverse discrimination when actual
discrimination is shown. In addition, the defendants do not want to
prove actual discrimination because doing so will likely elicit Title
VII suits by minorities. As a result, a court will be unaware of
evidence of actual discrimination. For this reason, the Weber Court
was unaware of important facts, namely that Kaiser had acquired
craft employees and trainees in a discriminatory manner. Had it had
these facts, the Court would probably have limited its inquiry into
permitted actions under Title VII and the holding would have been
affected significantly. Instead, the Supreme Court in Weber issued a
holding too broad to focus on the actual narrow issue. The issue
should have been whether Title VII forbids private employers from
adopting affirmative action plans created when self examination
reveals its hiring practices are arguably discriminatory. An appropriate resolution of this issue would have demonstrated that the
Kaiser-USWA plan was a proper response. The Court then would
never have reached the issue of whether societal discrimination may
be a basis for a remedy in compliance with Title VII.
VI.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 11246

Shortly after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
President Johnson issued Executive Order 11246 105 in order to foster
equal employment opportunity. Among other things, the order

104. 99 S. Ct. at 2726 (emphasis in original).
105. Discrimination in employment by government contractors has been prohibited,
by the use of Executive Orders, since the administration of President Franklin
Roosevelt. Exec. Order 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943 Compilation). As studies
revealed, however, contractors usually made no effort to comply with the
Executive Orders. COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, PATTERNS FOR PR()(1R~:SS
(Final Report) 14 (1961); UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIl. RIGHTS, EMPLOY.
MENT 92 (1961). In response to government contractors' non-compliance with
these apparently passive measures aimed at removing discriminatory employment practices, President Kennedy, in 1961, issued Executive Order 10925, 3
C.F.R. 448 <1959-1963 Compilation), which not only prohibited discrimination
by governmental contractors, but also required contractors to "take affirmative
action to ensure" non-discrimination. These two provisions were repeated in
Executive Order 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965), the Executive Order currently in
effect.
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requires government contractorsl06 such as Kaiser, to adopt affirmative action plans to eliminate discrimination. Additionally, regulations implementing the order place on the individual government
contractor the onus of determining whether women and minorities
were "underutilized"107 and, if so, of taking specific steps, including
the establishment of goals and timetables,108 designed to produce
equal employment. Finally, the order mandated affirmative action
even in the absence of a finding of past discrimination by a judicial
or administrative tribunapo9 and regardless of the source of the
discrimination. llO
Title VII's legislative history demonstrates that Executive Order
11246 and the statute do not conflict. Interpretive memoranda from
several United States Senators who were instrumental in achieving
the passage of Title VII indicate that Title VII in no way diminishes
the authority of the President to require government contractors to
implement necessary affirmative action programs as a condition

106. "A government contractor under Executive Order 11246 is an employer which
has: 50 or more employees and 0) a contract of $50,000 or more; or (2)
Government bills of lading which, in any 12-month period, total or can
reasonably be expected to total $50,000 or more; or (3) who serves as a
depository of Government funds in any amount; or (4) who is a financial
institution which is an issuing and paying agent for U.S. savings bonds and
savings notes in any amount." Revised Order No.4, 41 C.F.R. !i 60-2.1(a)
(979).
107. Underutilization is defined as having a lesser percentage of minorities in a
particular job category than would be expected by examining their representation in the available workforce. Revised Order No.4, 41 C.F.R. !i 60-2. 11(b)
(979).
108. Id. !i!i 60-2.10, 60-2.12 (979). Goals and timetables are really, in this instance,
no different than quotas proscribed under !i 703(j). According to a man who
served in the Labor Department and helped develop goals for minority
employment hiring for government contractors:
I now realize that the distinction we saw between goals and timetables
on the one hand, and unconstitutional quotas on the other, was not
valid. Our use of numerical standards in pursuit of equal opportunity
has led ineluctably to the very quotas, guaranteeing equal results, that
we wished to avoid.
Silberman, The Road to Racial Quotas, Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1977, at 12, col. 4.
109. S~lf !lnalysi!) is the determining factor as to whether affirmative action is
justified and required. 41 C.F.R. **60-2.11, 60-2.12 ([) (1979).
110. 41 C.F.R. !i 60-2.11 (979). It was held in Contractors Assoc. of E. Pa. v.
Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 176 (3d Cir.l, cert. denied, 404 U.s. 854
(971), that even though the unions were found to have discriminated and not
the contractors, the non-discriminating contractors in Philadelphia could be
forced to comply with Executive Order 11246:
[The contractors'] argument misconceives the source of the authority for
the affirmative action program. [The contractors] are not being
discriminated against. They are merely being invited to bid on a
contract with terms imposed by the source of the funds. . . . The Plan
does not impose a punishment for past misconduct. It exacts a covenant
for present performance.
(emphasis added).
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precedent to doing business with the government. III Furthermore, an
examination of the debates of the 1972 amendments to Title VII in
the Senate discloses that the members of that body flatly rejected
several attempts to use Title VII to dilute Executive Order 11246. 112
At the very least, this last occurrence demonstrates a specific
congressional intent not to preempt the field of equal employment
opportunity.

111. In an interpretive memorandum explaining Title VII to the Senate, Senators
Clark and Case, the bill's floor managers, discussed the facial conflict between
Title VII and the Executive Order program stating that Title VII "has no effect
on the responsibilities of the [President's Committee of Equal Employment
Opportunity] or on the authority possessed by the President or Federal
Agencies under existing law to deal with racial discrimination in the areas of
Federal Government employment and Federal contracts." 110 CONGo REC. 7215
(1964).
Additionally, an amendment by Senator Tower, which would have made
Title VII the exclusive federal remedy for employment discrimination, was
rejected. [d. 13650-52.
112. Senator Saxbe, concerned with a proposed merger provision of the Senate bill
which would have merged the Executive Order enforcement power with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, believed that the merger would
have diluted the Executive Order program. The Senator stated in a speech
proposing an amendment to strike the merger provision from the bill:
The Executive Order program should not be confused with the judicial
remedies for proven discrimination which unfold on a limited and
expensive case-by-case basis. Rather, affirmative action means that all
Government contractors must develop programs to insure that all share
equally in the jobs generated by the Federal Government's spending.
Proof of overt discrimination is not required.
118 CONGo REC. 1385 (1972) (emphasis added). Senator Saxbe's amendment was
adopted, [d. at 1387-98, and served to show the desire of the Senate for an
independent and strong agency supervising the program governing federal
contracts. Congressman Dent proposed a similar merger provision amendment
to the main bill in the House. The Dent amendment was defeated. [d. at 32111.
In confirming the power of the Executive Order program to prescribe goals,
timetables, and other types of preferential treatment for federal contractors, the
Senate defeated Senator Ervin's proposal to expand section 703(j) of Title VII.
Ervin's amendment provided: "Nothing contained in this title or in Executive
Order No. 11246, or in any other law or Executive Order, shall be interpreted to
require any employer. . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or
to any group" because of a statistical disparity between the percentage of those
persons employed and the percentage in the local available workforce. 118
CONGo REC. 4917 (1972) (emphasis added). Senator Ervin freely acknowledged
that the amendment was intended to destroy the entire Executive Order
program. 118 CONGo REC. 1663 (1972). Another Ervin amendment, also defeated,
would have prohibited any "department or agency or officer of the United
States" from requiring any employer to hire "persons of a particular race . . .
in either fixed or variable numbers, proportions, percentages, quotas, goals, or
ranges." 118 CONGo REC. 1663 (1972). The Senate's rejection of the Ervin
amendment, 118 CONGo REC. 4918 (1972), exhibited its understanding that Title
VII and Executive Order 11246 did not conflict. Section 703(j) only limited
remedies under Title VII, not under the Executive Order program. Contractors
Assoc. of E. Pa. V. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 854 (1971).
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Because of the legislative approach to Executive Order 11246,
the executive branch has unquestioned authority to implement the
order fully. Indeed, in an analogous situation over two decades ago,
the Supreme Court stated:
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum,
for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all
that Congress can delegate . . . . If his act is held unconstitutional under the c~rcumstances it usually means that the
Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power.ll3
Furthermore, under such circumstances, the "burden of persuasion
[rests] heavily on any who might attack it."ll4 The legislative history
of Title VII indicates that with respect to Executive Order 11246,
this burden could not be met.
Within the factual scenario of Weber, the Executive Order would.
have insured the plaintiffs defeat even had the Supreme Court held
that the Kaiser plan violated Title VII. Department of Labor
regulations issued pursuant to the order specifically stated that one
area of employment in which minorities are most likely to be
underutilized is skilled crafts. ll5 In addition, the regulations indicate
that underutilization is manifested in a lower percentage of minority
workers in a particular job than in the general workforce. ll6 Kaiser, a
government contractor, was therefore required under Executive
Order 11246 to adopt an affirmative action plan because of its
underutilization of blacks in the Gramercy plant's craft positions.117
In fact, it instituted just such a program, using its one-to-one
quota. IIS

113. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1954).
114. [d. at 637.
115. Revised Order No.4, 41 C.F.R. 60-2.11 (1979). "The provisions of Revised
Order No.4, issued under Executive Order 11246, have the force of law." Legal
Aid Soc'y of Alameda County v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319, 1329 & n.14 (9th Cir.
1979>.
116. Revised Order No.4, 41 C.F.R. 60-2.11 (1979).
117. See note 18 supra.
118. The Kaiser-USWA quota comported with the regulations determining what
type of affirmative action was permitted to be used by an employer after
underutilization is found to exist. The Kaiser-USWA plan used on-the-job
training programs, Revised Order No.4, 41 C.F.R.
60-2.11(b)(1)(viiil,
60-2.20(a)(1) (1979), it established a goal based on minority representation in
the local workforce, [d. 60-2.11(b)(1)(iiil (1979), and it provided for a hiring
ratio of blacks designed to attain the goal with white participation. [d.
60-2.12(c), (d) & (g) (1979>'
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VII. CONCLUSION
Kaiser and the United Steelworkers of America devised a
voluntary affirmative action plan which was validated by the
Supreme Court under Title VII. The Court upheld that plan because
it was voluntarily adopted in order to reach a racial balance between
the percentage of blacks in the skilled craft workforce and the
percentage of blacks in the geographical area. The Court, however,
came to the correct conclusion, but for the wrong reasons. Title VII
permits a private elI1ployer to .act voluntarily to correct an arguable
violation of the statute, but specifically prohibits action, voluntarily
adopted or court ordered, to create a racial balance in the absence of
discriminatory employment practices by an employer or a labor
organization creating the racial imbalance. The Court nonetheless
came to the correct conclusion because Kaiser had maintained craft
employment practices which arguably would have resulted in a
violation of Title VII had suit been brought by a black worker
claiming discrimination. Furthermore, had these employment practices not constituted even an arguable violation of Title VII,
Executive Order 11246 would have validated the Kaiser-USWA
plan.
A careful consideration of the Weber decision would logically
lead one to conclude that the employer would be well advised to
institute affirmative action programs in almost all situations of
racial imbalance. The employer would have nothing to lose and
everything to gain.ll9 Without increasing the number of black
employees towards a racial balance, the employer likely would be
subjected to suits by blacks for Title VII violations. Using the Weber
standard, an employer could avoid possible suits by instituting a
hiring goal or a quota similar to that order in Weber. Inasmuch as
almost all employment classifications have traditionally exhibited
the effects of societal discrimination, the employer's affirmative
action plan would likely prevent successful reverse discrimination
suits from occurring. As a result, although the effects of the decision
are not yet fully known, Weber will likely produce employment
practices inconsistent with the intent of Congress when it enacted
Title VII.
Glenn Weinberg
119. Neuborne, Observations on Weber. 54 N.Y.V. L.
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